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Abstract 
With recent leaps in the field of robotics and artificial intelligence, the boundary 
between science fiction and reality continues to blur, especially as computers 
performing actions previously thought to be unique only to man (often times, more 
efficiently) becomes more common. Though challenged by the traversal of the physical 
realm, their capabilities of mimicking human problem solving and creativity is growing 
exponentially.  
In discovering this potential lies the possibility of a cultural and scientific 
enrichment, the likes of which will dwarf both the Renaissance and the Industrial 
Revolution, respectively. Naturally this is accompanied by countless inventions and 
artistic expressions from which society will inevitably benefit. However, due to their 
originators likely being wholly, or at least in part, computers, the question will arise as 
to who their true owners will be from a legal standpoint. 
This article will examine the extent to which human and machine intelligence 
can be compared and will attempt to ascertain the ways in which the latter could pose 
a threat to the system of Intellectual Property laws in place to protect the rights of 
creators. Where possible, the piece will also attempt to propose potential remedies 
and pre-emptive actions to alleviate the dangers such a synthetic revolution could 
cause to IP’s legal framework. 
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Introduction 
Throughout the ages, science fiction writers and futurists alike have dreamt of a world 
in which technological advancements have created machines capable of mimicking 
and reproducing intelligence indistinguishable from that of unaltered humans. With the 
recent frequent leaps in the computational potential of computer systems and 
staggering advancements in programming, machines are beginning to exhibit what is, 
at first glance, human intelligence. Thus, a Jules Verne-esque future seems likely to 
be upon us soon. If we are to accept these signs as evidence of an impending cognitive 
revolution, it seems imperative to ensure the current legal framework is well equipped 
to deal with the inevitably emerging matters of ownership of non-corporeal creations; 
in other words, Intellectual Property.  
The aim of this paper is to show that the current legal framework cannot 
effectively deal with all impending implications of the rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
in all its forms. Done through an initial discussion of theories of intelligence exploring 
machines’ capability of exhibiting intelligence in a way similar enough to how humans 
exhibit it, and whether this qualifies them for IP protection. Next, a depiction of the core 
justification theories of IP will be presented for use throughout the essay. 
Subsequently, a series of contemporary examples will be provided which will 
challenge specific elements of IP law in the areas of copyright and patent. These will 
be succeeded by exploration of more conceptual developments which would further 
cast doubt on the system’s ability to accommodate radical changes. Potential solutions 
will be suggested where available, however the theoretical nature of the ideas 
explored will prove to be a barrier for all encompassing remedies. Finally, a summary 
of the arguments proposed will be presented, ultimately aiming to convince the reader 
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that preparations should be made to the current legal system if IP as we know it is to 
survive a cognitive revolution. 
 
Is artificial intelligence equal to human intelligence? 
The common-sense understanding of artificial intelligence is generally limited to the 
imagery of a sentient digital entity capable of independent thought, whether housed in 
a mobile robotic hull or a computer system. Popular culture has disseminated this 
image through both the film industry1 and literary works,2 which are often adapted into 
movies themselves. However, it is often forgotten, that at its core, AI is a computer 
program created to behave in the manner of natural intelligence, be it through mirroring 
it or more recently by following example through machine learning. Throughout this 
essay, it is vital to note that all examples explored will not necessarily be limited to the 
common-sense understanding of AI, but will be affected by it to differing extents. 
The academic community is greatly divided regarding the accurate definition of 
intelligence. A discussion of AI with regards to all possible definitions would be nearly 
inexhaustible. To avoid this, four theories will be briefly analysed, and an 
amalgamation will be adopted as a basis for arguments to follow. 
Perhaps the founding and most notable definition of intelligence can be 
extracted from Descartes’ expression, ‘I think, therefore I am.’3 While itself not a 
definition of intelligence, the notion can be understood to suggest that the very act of 
reasoning inherent in the process of thinking is proof of existence, provided the 
                                                          
1 See Stanley Kubrick, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) for one of the most popular examples of AI 
portrayed in that image 
2 See Isaac Asimov, Bicentennial Man (1976) and Chris Columbus, Bicentennial Man (1999) for its 
subsequent movie adaptation 
3 René Descartes The Principles of Philosophy (John Veitch, Blackmask Online, 2002) 10, 11 
Available at <https://faculty.iiit.ac.in/~bipin/files/Dawkins/New/Descartes%252C%20Rene%20-
%20The%20Principles%20of%20Philosophy.pdf> Accessed 22/01/2018 
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organism is aware of the process taking place. From this, the base requirements of 
intelligence can be extrapolated as being the ability to reason and the realisation of its 
taking place.  
However, given its position as the bedrock argument for existence, it has been 
severely criticised throughout the ages by academics for being insufficient in fully 
defining intelligence as evident in humanity. Damasio disagrees that reasoning 
capabilities and the realisation of their use is enough to prove intelligence.4 He argues 
that at the core of what humans perceive as intelligence is the ability to feel emotions.5 
It is key to note that Damasio does not imply that reasoning is to be removed from the 
equation of intelligence.6 
Moravec sees mobility as a requirement for intelligence.7 In his argument he 
believes that reasoning is merely built upon previous information accrued over the 
millennia of human evolution, namely unconscious sensorimotor knowledge.8 He 
presents the comparison between plant and animal, where the animal, due to its 
mobility, shows signs of what would be interpreted as intelligence, whereas the plant, 
according to Moravec, may eventually develop ‘something akin to nervous action’; ‘but 
the life expectancy of the universe may be insufficient.’9 Put simply, due to their 
mobility, animals can show signs of intelligence where plants cannot. He bases this 
on the necessity of exploration, which he does not expand on, but can be reasonably 
understood as necessary for the neural network to be stimulated by new information. 
Clearly, plants’ immobility prevents this. However, even if this theory holds true, in an 
                                                          
4 Antonio Damasio Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Avon Books New York, 
1995) 248 Available at <https://bdgrdemocracy.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/descartes-error_antonio-
damasio.pdf> Accessed 22/01/2018 
5 ibid 
6 ibid 
7 Hans Moravec Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Harvard University 
Press, 1988) 
8 ibid 15 
9 ibid 16 
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interconnected world where a single computer can simultaneously communicate with 
billions of others the globe over and gather information from countless input devices - 
microphones, cameras, satellite coverage, to name a few - any computer system with 
access to the world wide web capable of reasoning would be constantly introduced 
immeasurable quantities of new information. It should be noted that Moravec’s vision, 
though forward thinking, was based prior to the World Wide Web entering the public 
domain and becoming what we know it as today. Thus, Moravec’s theory can still be 
applicable, but only if movement is interpreted as a means of information gathering 
and data collection being the indicator of intelligence. 
Despite the differences in these theories, a fundamental and irreducible 
similarity exists. It is that the ability to reason and deduce is a core necessity for 
intelligence to exist. To this, we can apply Moravec’s prediction that AI will be able to 
‘distinguish reasonable situations from absurd ones, and to intuit some solutions by 
observing them happen in its model’10 and its effectual modern reality, whereby 
computers collate information and deduce the most appropriate solution to a 
problem.11 It is here that we see evidence of Moravec’s prediction of biological and 
post-biological intelligence beginning to dissolve, where machines, or AI, not only 
reach human level intelligence, but exceed it many times fold. He bases this argument 
on a rough calculation of a human brain’s computational capabilities of 10 trillion 
calculations per second,12 a threshold broken in 2011 and currently eclipsed by the 
fastest modern supercomputer.13 Thus, it can be concluded that modern computers 
                                                          
10 ibid 20 
11 Maurice Conti, ‘The incredible inventions of intuitive AI’ (Speech at TEDxProtland, Portland, 15 April 
2016) <https://www.ted.com/talks/maurice_conti_the_incredible_inventions_of_intuitive_ai> Accessed 
22/01/2018 
12 Hans Moravec (n 7) 59 
13 Jack Dongarra, ‘Report on the Sunway TaihuLight System’ (University of Tennessee, 2016) 
<http://www.netlib.org/utk/people/JackDongarra/PAPERS/sunway-report-2016.pdf> Accessed 
22/01/2018 
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and their work is to a degree on par with that of humans’ intellectual labour. This will 
act as the basis for the arguments throughout this essay. 
 
Justifications of IP law 
The fundamental principle underlining IP law is the idea that a person must be 
rewarded for their work, which is not too different from the core reasoning behind the 
concept of ownership in property law. The essential difference, however, is that the 
latter deals with rights to the tangible objects which are easy to assess and perceive, 
such as a book. The former is instead concerned with the non-corporeal forming part 
of the same object, such as the tale told in the very same book. However, since the 
ultimate result of IP is the conferring of monopoly rights to a person over the use of 
something, it is generally necessary to justify it in the face of the democratic state we 
inhabit.14 This is because granting monopoly power over socially significant 
technological inventions and cultural artefacts demands the approval of the populace 
it affects.15 In a democratic state built upon the forfeiture of rights by its citizens,16 it 
would be entirely unjust if such preferential treatment is afforded to a person without 
appropriate justification. Conversely, we risk IP to be perceived as an unjust method 
of rewards propagating favouritism and nepotism. Three theories will be briefly 
outlined which have been employed to achieve such justification. 
                                                          
14 Tanya Aplin and Jennifer Davis, Intellectual Property Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) p 3 
15 ibid 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (St Paul’s Churchyard, 1651) Available at 
<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm> Accessed on 8/08/2018 
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Labour theories 
Locke argues that the application of labour is the natural process every human must 
endure to stake their claim on the world.17 He stipulates that a person should only be 
awarded rights associated with such matters for ‘the labour of his body, and the work 
of his hands’.18 Effectively, he sees it necessary for a person to apply some sort of 
force to their surrounding world in order to shape something previously non-existent 
and it is this creation that rights should be awarded for. Thus, such rights emerge 
naturally from the work done and the theory falls into the class of `Natural justification 
theories. ` While the theory is originally created to justify awarding property rights over 
corporeal things, not of the intangible, it can easily be adapted to suit the purposes of 
IP law. The requirement of raw physical labour, such as that of building a house, can 
simply be substituted for mental exertion, which can be evidenced by similar 
applications of force in the form of numerous trials and errors, an application of effort, 
skill, as well as time invested into its creation.19 
 
Personality theories 
These theories also fall under the category of `Natural justification theories` as they 
value the unique individual characteristics of creators. They also argue that a spark of 
genius is necessary for the creation of something new, which should be rewarded with 
IP rights.20 Hegel places importance on the relationship between the creator and their 
work as he finds that in the act of creation and in the final product lies a unique creative 
                                                          
17 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) 
Available at <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf> Accessed 
23/01/2018 
18 ibid 116 
19 Hyperion Records Limited v Sawkins [2005] EWCA Civ 565 at 16 
20 Rosemary Coombe The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims 
in the Cultural Appropriation in K Engle and D Danielson (eds.) After Identity: Essays in Law and 
Culture (New York: Routledge Chapman and Hall 1995) 251-272 258 
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imprint of the personality of the original maker.21 Though the theory does recognise 
that a sort of ‘force’ is necessary for the creation of the work, it sees it as one derived 
from the sheer will of the creator, not his physical labour.22 In a sense, Hegel sees the 
process of creation is one intended to develop the creator’s personality.23 Or to put in 
other words, the process matures the character of the creator. Thus, the theory argues 
that the special bond established between creation and creator should be legitimised 
through IP rights. 
 
Economic theory 
The economic justification theory differs from `Natural justification theories` in that it 
values the benefit of society over that of the individual creators. It sees IP right as a 
necessary system for facilitation of economic growth.24 It aims to create a public 
incentive for future inventive and creative minds to find a profitable future in creating 
scientific, technological and cultural advancements.25 The theory effectively attempts 
to encourage creators of IP content to embark into more entrepreneurial endeavours 
and see this as a potentially profitable career26. Thus, the system acts pre-emptively 
by promising a reward, as opposed to simply rewarding a creator for harnessing their 
spark of genius after the fact. The social benefit element of the theory is best 
exemplified in the case of patents: while the creator does indeed receive a reward for 
                                                          
21 ibid 
22 Kanu Priya, Intellectual Property and Hegelian Justification 1 NUJS L. Rev. (2008) 359 361 
23 Peter Drahos A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Ashgate 1996) 79 
24 William Landes Copyright Protection and Appropriation Art (Chicago Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 113, 2001) 
25 Suzanne Scotchmer Innovation and Incentives (MIT Press; 2006) in T Aplin and J Davis Intellectual 
Property Law, Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 14 
26 For the purpose of clarity throughout this piece, persons responsible for the creation of IP content 
will be referred to as ‘creators’ regardless of the form the content takes – copyrightable, patentable or 
other form of IP 
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their effort, they must undergo full disclosure of their invention, so the scientific world 
can learn and improve in that area.27 
 
Intelligent and semi-autonomous AI 
‘If you assume any rate of advancement in AI, [humans] will be left 
behind by a lot.’28 
 
This is how Elon Musk sees the future of the race between human and machine 
intelligence. The perceived threat to humanity posed by the advancement of AI has 
received notoriety in recent times with numerous warnings by the world’s leading 
scientific minds and AI researchers including Peter Norvig, Mustafa Suleyman, 
Stephen Hawking and others.29 In order to give humanity a fighting chance against 
machines, Musk proposes that a hybridisation is necessary. The recent launch of his 
newest company, Neuralink, aims to explore that very possibility, attempting to 
produce computer-brain implants, ‘neural laces’ allowing humans to effectively reach 
machine level computational capabilities.30 He sees this as ‘maybe the best’ solution 
to this bleak future for human intelligence.31 
An alternative is argued to lie in a continued servitude of machines to humans. 
However, the machine would not simply rely on direct physical input by a human to be 
used to solve a problem, but would rather take part in a kind of cooperation with the 
                                                          
27 Best captured in Article I Section 8 Clause 8 of the United States Constitution 
28 Recode ‘Elon Musk | Full interview | Code Conference 2016’ Available at 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wsixsRI-Sz4> Accessed 24/01/2018 
29 “An Open Letter: Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence” (Future of Life 
Institute, 2015) Available at <https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/> Accessed on 14/06/2018 
30 The Guardian, ‘Elon Musk wants to connect brains to computers with new company’ (2016) 
Available at <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/28/elon-musk-merge-brains-
computers-neuralink> Accessed 23/01/2018 
31 Recode Elon Musk (n 28) 
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human, necessitating only certain parameters and preferences to be input.32 The 
result of this would be the AI’s autonomous generation of all conceivable solutions to 
the problem and presenting the user with the most likely ones to fit their preferences. 
Thus, a sort of `communication` would act as the basis for prosperous future 
relationships between man and machine, effectively chaining the seemingly limitless 
potential of AI to the will of the user who no longer need rely on physical input, 
dominant in such interactions today. 
However, both these possibilities pose potential threats to the fabric of IP’s 
underlying principles used to legitimise its existence and will shortly be explored in 
detail. 
 
Augmented humans 
Augmenting humans entails integration of a machine into the human brain, which 
would provide that person with inhuman computational power. Effectively, such 
symbiotic relationships will see the natural human intelligence improved through 
synergistic operation with an implanted AI – akin to a hardware upgrade affixed to a 
typical computer system. In this sense, the line where the person’s natural intelligence 
ends and AI begins will be blurred, as the two will interact seamlessly. The workload 
required from such a person to solve any problem will be strikingly lower than that 
required of a non-augmented human, who will represent the majority of the world’s 
population at that time. For example, within the span of one hour, a machine-learning 
program managed to understand, replicate and improve a Nobel Prize winning 
process for creating Bose-Einstein Condensates (BEC), the coldest state of matter.33 
                                                          
32 Maurice Conti (n 11) 
33 Paul Wigley, Patrick Everitt and ors. ‘Fast machine-learning online optimization of ultra-cold-atom 
experiments’ (Nature.com Scientific Reports 6, Article number: 25890 2016) Available at  
<http://www.nature.com/articles/srep25890> Accessed 24/01/2018 
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To put this into perspective, without prior knowledge it took a program one hour to 
recreate the years of work of three of the brightest minds in physics. Moore’s law, 
which states that processing power will double every eighteen years for the 
foreseeable future given the increase in number of transistors on circuit boards 
compared to their reduction in price over time,34 gives artificial intelligence an 
undeniable advantage in this race. Though Moore’s law is seen to be at its end,35 
methods like machine learning are stepping in to compensate and continue the 
exponential progression of computer intelligence. 
The obvious IP implication of this is that the very first few humans augmented 
with such technology will be able to produce countless patentable products or 
processes. The creator would then undergo the patent process for all these products 
and processes.36 These would easily satisfy the requirement of novelty under the UK 
patent system as they would arguably outclass the current state of the art37 and 
inevitably possess a ‘technical feature … not previously been made available to the 
public’.38 The patent would surely also involve an inventive step, yet another UK patent 
requirement, as it would solve present scientific issues.39 Given the potential 
complexity of the solutions, it would likely not be obvious to an appropriate Person 
Skilled in the Art (PSA) of the inventions given the established state of the art40, as the 
above example shows the program took alternative, more effective steps to those of 
the original process to achieve the same result.41 As such, PSAs on which the law 
                                                          
34 “Moore’slaw” (Investopedia, 2015) Available at 
<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mooreslaw.asp? Accessed on 14/06/2018 
35 The Economist ‘The future of computing’ (2016) Available at 
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21694528-era-predictable-improvement-computer-
hardware-ending-what-comes-next-future> Accessed 24/01/2018 
36 Patents Act 1977 S1 
37 ibid S2(2) 
38 T 0059/87 (Friction reducing additives) (1990) 
39 T 0931/95 (Controlling pension benefits system) (2001) 
40 Patent Act 1977 S3 
41 Paul Wigley (n 33) 
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relies in its test to ascertain whether an invention is novel and worthy of patenting will 
become virtually obsolete as they would either be incapable of comprehending the AIs 
methods or would simply relegate to always deem the matter patentable. Alternatively, 
a minor setback could be the UK approach of identifying similarities in the claims with 
those of prior art42, but this relies purely on the method of drafting the patent and would 
not prevent the acquisition of a patent after claim amendment. In reality, the only actual 
delay which could slow such a patent onslaught would be the strict language 
necessary for filing, as the claims form the essence of the patent.43 This is, however, 
a double-edged sword. While it will prevent an immediate influx of applications, they 
will merely be delayed and with an average wait time of 18 months, the sheer amount 
will flood and overburden the patent office. While the same technology could 
eventually be employed by the patent office to offset such delays, the process’ current 
reliance on PSAs necessitates the adoption of an adapted AI compatible process 
which goes beyond the human factor. However, machine learning itself uses existing 
examples to which to adapt, meaning that any system used by the patent office would 
be a step behind the entrepreneurial systems used by creators. This point will be 
further explored when discussing the matter of Generative Adversarial Networks. 
Finally, such patents would likely be considered as having industrial application given 
the lenient requirements in the UK which only require there to be a plausible and 
reasonably credible application of the invention.44 
From an economic justification theory standpoint, this scenario is potentially 
disastrous. While astronomical technological progress will likely be attained, it will 
come at the price of the fundamental principle of incentivising the public to aspire to 
                                                          
42 Windsurfing v Tabur Marine [1985] RPC 59 
43 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v Norton [1996] RPC 76 
44 C-493/12 Eli Lilly and Company Ltd v Human Genome Sciences Inc [2013] All ER (D) 157 
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invent inherent in the patent bargain justification theory. Ultimately, with the advent of 
such augmentations, it is likely that certain individuals will hold patent rights to 
numerous products and processes in specific fields of expertise. The multiplicity of 
patents afforded to them would create an imbalance in patent ownership as a handful 
of people will effectively own the majority of patents in these fields. This, however, is 
the benign situation in which it is assumed the augmented are niche specialists in a 
certain area, ignoring others. Seeing as how a single augmented person would be able 
to replace entire teams of scientists working on complex problems, which the 
augmented can resolve in phenomenal time, the number of potential creators who 
would see a future in innovation would plummet, as they cannot compete with 
augmented humans, unless they are augmented themselves.  
The public policy justification of encouraging the furthering of technological 
advancements through widespread availability of patents effectively promotes 
exchange of ideas and openness of scientific progress. The scientific community, 
which prides itself on global interconnectivity and sharing of ideas through scientific 
papers and conventions will be drowned in silence out of fears that if a project is 
publicised, an augmented human would resolve it within record time, obtain monopoly 
over the creation and render an entire research team unfunded. The righteous goal of 
the theory would be jeopardised as the only way a non-augmented person would be 
able to attain a patent and the reward behind it would be if research topics are kept 
secret and any scientific progress in the field remains undisclosed until the researchers 
deem a breakthrough has been reached. This would be fuelled by a fear that 
augmented humans will be able to use existing research by the non-augmented to 
achieve scientific breakthrough much faster. However, due to that very fear, peer 
review, the cornerstone of technological progress, will be minimised, thus effectively 
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further slowing scientific progress of non-augmented humans. This in itself could 
cause a calamitous societal divide, but this is a separate discussion. Ultimately, the 
patent bargain justification theory will falter due to failures of its core rationales: more 
trade secrets will emerge; competition will be discouraged; subsequently that will 
impact the public’s drive for progress in arts and sciences. 
As Bentley and Sherman argue, the natural theorist’s core reasoning for 
granting IP rights is that ‘it is right and proper to do so’.45 Yet given the above, it would 
arguably seem counterintuitive to effectively award the rights of countless scientific 
innovations to a handful of people. Even from a labour justification theory, which 
usually deals with copyright, it would seem unjust to reward someone for inventing 
something they would spend an hour on, or less given computational progress, when 
similar breakthroughs require the dedication of an entire life’s work of a group of 
intellectuals. While time alone may not be sufficient justification, the effort, or “pains”, 
associated with the elapsed time would be the convincing factor.46 To reiterate, it begs 
the question whether it would be fair and just to award someone with monopoly over 
a complex invention if they invest what is to them minimal effort, skill and time into a 
project, even if it is novel and original. 
Effectively, IP laws will struggle with striking a balance between the work of 
such intellectual superhumans and non-augmented individuals, regardless of which of 
the above examined justification theories is used. Particularly with patents for 
technological innovations, it will be almost impossible to obtain by the latter since the 
highest end of technology will be dominated by the former. As such, the rise of AI 
augmented humans will result in their unintentional abuse of the existing IP legal 
                                                          
45 Lionel Bently, Brad Sherman Intellectual Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 36 
46 John Locke (n 17) p27 
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framework which will leave non-augmented persons at a nearly insurmountable 
disadvantage. 
 
Human – machine partnership 
The current status quo in everyday interaction between humans and machines is one 
of user and tool. This has been so throughout history, with the potential applications 
and uses of the tools widening, but the product of their application being limited to 
manual input by the users. ‘The chisel only carves where the artist points it’.47 
However, this gradual widening of the tool’s capabilities is reaching a point at which 
we are no longer able to harness them to their full potential. This is where a partnership 
between man and machine would allow for better exploitation of our own tools. The 
rapid development of speech recognition software is already evidence of such a 
relationship and with the introduction of AI. The limits of such interactions are 
substantially widened from search query requests and simple task fulfilment requests. 
Such interactions present an example of clear separation between natural and artificial 
intelligence, which takes the form of a computer program and differs from the common-
sense understanding of AI as it is not entirely autonomous. 
Maurice Conti offers a glimpse into the operation of such a partnership as he 
describes the assisted design process of a car or drone, following the input of specific, 
well-defined problems into a ‘generative’ design AI.48 He refers to them as ‘generative’ 
as they reach original solutions to the users’ well-defined problems. This is achieved 
without any supervision, guidance or any input by the user, other than the addition or 
change of a parameter. The result is that the computer generates every possible 
                                                          
47 Maurice Conti (n 11) 
48 ibid 
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solution to the problem, from which the user may select the ones they believe best 
suits their interest. Yet he does not see these systems as smart, because they lack 
intuition inherent in living organisms like a dog. However, he argues that soon we will 
see such ‘intuitive’ AI, which will accurately suggest what the final solution should be.49 
The applications of this can be grandiose, such as solving climate change, or creating 
the ultimate car chassis. All this points towards such systems being widely used on a 
daily basis. 
There are serious implications of such a relationship on IP however. Many 
questions are raised as to the ownership of any rights to products created by such a 
co-operation. Section 214 of the Copyright, Design and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 
establishes that the owner of computer-generated designs will be the person who has 
undertaken the ‘arrangements necessary for the creation of the design’. Regarding 
copyright, Section 9(3) states the same for literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works. 
In the example of the car chassis, that would be the user who has input the parameters 
into the AI. However, this only relates to the final product chosen and says nothing of 
the countless other alternatives generated by the system. It is unclear whether the 
user would also gain rights in all IP generated by the computer. 
The following example shows the lack of clarity as to when and how rights will 
be allocated. The Library of Babel is an algorithm tasked with generating every 
possible combination of English characters and when finished, would contain every 
book or literary interpretation of song, play, scientific paper, legal decision, speech and 
etcetera ever written and ever to be written. Under the statutory guidance, the creator 
who initiated the algorithm would have IP rights in anything created by the code. 
Barring the replication of already existing works and the rights afforded to their 
                                                          
49 ibid 
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creators, it is not clear whether the code’s creator would also be the owner of every 
future iteration of the English language, including this essay. 
The courts will first struggle to define such a creation as while it is titled `library` 
and may be akin to a database or encyclopaedia, it differs greatly as it contains within 
it works not yet created, or rather, created by it.50 Said works in themselves, as per 
encyclopaedias, have separate copyrights given to their respective creators.51 
One possible way to tackle this problem is by reliance on the substantiality 
element of copyright. The general rule is that though the copying of too many minor 
elements may amount to copyright infringement52 there is no infringement if a 
substantial portion of the work is not copied. Instead of seeing the work of the algorithm 
as separate creations, we may consider it one long sequence of characters, separated 
into compartments for easier access to particular segments. From this, it can be 
argued that due to the sheer size of the work created, the reproduction of even a book 
which can be found inside is so insignificant that it would not result in an infringement. 
However, the ‘sequence of characters’ argument can be applied to any literary work 
and it would indubitably fail.  
An alternative could be the application of the necessity for the work to convey 
information, instruction or pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment.53 This way, 
considering that the majority is ineligible, it can be argued that no pleasure can be 
extracted. However, suppose a machine-learning AI code is introduced which sieves 
through the vast work and finds sequences which it considers to be enjoyable to 
humans. Such could be anything from a joke, to an interesting story, to an equivalent 
of a Shakespearean tragedy. Clearly these would bring pleasure to the reader. 
                                                          
50 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Article 2(5) 
51 ibid 
52 Designer Guild Limited v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Limited (2000) 1 All ER 700 
53 Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 241 
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Another problematic example is raised by Google’s Deep Dream, a software 
collating pictures and photographs by users and creating completely original 
amalgams of them or using one picture and applying a particular style of another image 
to it. Here, users simply choose a variety of images and have the AI merge them, add 
its own `artistic take` on them and, if the user chooses, stylise them in a certain 
manner. Two questions are raised by this: whether the copyrights of the images are 
infringed; and whether the creation warrants copyright. 
It is unclear how the former will be answered as generally, despite the various 
alterations applied to a certain work, if the labour associated with it is not of the right 
‘kind’ the rights will be infringed.54 However, the kind of alterations here are novel and 
undiscussed in cases. Furthermore, the unanswerable question as to the quantum of 
changes is ever present and more complicated,55 especially if there are multiple 
original images, due to the final version often bearing almost no resemblance to any 
of the original images. 
From the perspective of natural justification theories giving IP rights in either 
case seems inappropriate. The work conducted by the actual user is almost entirely 
unrelated to the final product to justify any rights under the labour theory. The example 
of the sieving program only sees the code written, while Deep Dream only chooses 
the images. Similarly, no personality, genius or attachment can be said to exist 
between the product of the code in the second example and the programmer who 
wrote it. Though it can be argued that selection of images and choice of style could 
evidence some personality and even relationship with the Deep Dream’s images, it is 
merely superficial, and no trace of genius can be seen to warrant rights under the 
                                                          
54 Fylde Microsystems Limited v Key Radio Systems Limited (1998) EWHC Patents 340 
55 Interlego v Tyco Industries (1988) 3 All ER 949 
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personality theory. Neither scenario will benefit from an originality based approach as 
even applying the theory that modern AI intelligence can be equated to human 
intelligence, the final product in both cases has few to no elements expressing the 
user’s intellectual creation.56 However, Deep Dream’s creations have been accepted 
in society as a new art form and have been sold at auctions57, evidencing that society 
values things it sees as interesting and the parameters of art are constantly evolving, 
as in the case of minimalism and other art styles. Similarly, it may be time for classical 
natural justification theories to adopt more contemporary notions of modernity, else 
the world will be populated with countless unjustly unclaimed artworks. 
 
Autonomous AI 
So far, the article has discussed only the existence of AIs dependent on the input of 
users. However, with the process called machine learning, an AI can teach itself not 
only how to solve problems, but also to create original literary and artistic works of art. 
In this sense, this form of AI is the closest this essay will examine to the common-
sense understanding of autonomous Artificial Intelligence. 
An example of this can be found in Generative Adversarial Networks.58 These 
are systems of two AIs where one creates artistic works, while the second attempts to 
distinguish whether they are generated by the former or are pre-existing images. Thus, 
through the process of machine learning, which is essentially a trial and error 
process59, both become progressively better at their assigned tasks. The former AI, 
                                                          
56 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (2009) All ER (D) 212 
57 Cade Metz ‘Google’s Artificial Brain Is Pumping Out Trippy And Pricey Art’ (WIRED 2016) Available 
at <https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-artificial-intelligence-gets-first-art-show> Accessed 
24/01/2018 
58 Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie and ors. Generative Adversarial Nets (arXiv.org, Cornel 
University Library 2014) Available at <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf> Accessed on 24/01/2018 
59 Ethem Alpaydin Introduction to Machine Learning (MIT Press, 2014) 3 
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however, raises the question of authorship of the works it creates. Relying on statute60 
would mean that the creator would rake in countless copyrightable works without 
applying any creative labour to the process other than writing the code itself, which is 
a separate, literary copyright.61 
Exacerbating the matter further, AIs are coming ever closer to overcoming the 
essential tool for distinguishing between them and an actual human – the Turing test.62 
In essence, two parties comprise the test: (1) judges and (2) either a human or a 
machine. These parties then proceed to have a conversation via typing, whereby the 
judges attempt to accurately determine whether the other party is a computer or 
human. If the computer successfully convinces the judges that it is human, then it 
passes the test. The criteria by which this is decided, however, is ultimately 
subjective.63 Though there have been reports of AIs succeeding in the test, they have 
been done by `chatbots` which are merely code expertly tailored to confuse, but not 
hold a conversation, arguably not possessing intelligence. However, it is perfectly 
plausible that AI will be able to overcome this barrier, becoming indistinguishable from 
humans. It is only a matter of scientific progress. 
Since the law understandably only deals with human creators, it cannot be 
expected that any rights are given to a machine creator. To avoid having unclaimed 
artworks, rights to them will have to be allocated somewhere and it would likely be the 
programmer. However, in this case we will bring the same complexities as those of 
semi-autonomous AIs. This raises a very profound philosophical debate of what it 
means to be human and what it takes to justify receiving rights, a debate which has 
                                                          
60 CDPA 1988 Section 9(3) 
61 ibid Section 3(1)(b) 
62 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy The Turing Test (2003) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test/> Accessed 23/01/2018 
63 ibid  
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recently received an unexpected revival by Sophia, the world’s first robot awarded 
citizenship (declared by Saudi Arabia).64 As Drahos notes, Locke’s labour theory is 
founded on the belief that God gave man the world and every person owns 
themselves, their labour, and anything in the world mixed with their labour.65 If this is 
so, then the labour theory falls apart in this scenario as what is discussed in relation 
to AI is humans effectively being gods in creating other intellectually human-like 
beings. In the hypothetical example of a real-world simulation being made and 
populated with AIs utterly indistinguishable from humans, would it be just for anyone 
but the AIs to bear rights to creations they make inside the simulation? To reiterate, 
would it be just for humans, acting as gods, to claim ownership over any scientific 
breakthroughs achieved by AIs populating a simulated reality which to them is the 
same as what our reality is to us? Applying this to the scenario similar to augmented 
humans, such AIs would have similar unparalleled computational powers and would 
create patents aplenty. If the AIs indistinguishable from humans are not awarded rights 
for themselves, then who should be awarded if anyone. And, if no one will receive IP 
rights to the AIs’ creations, would this mean the death of the patent system? Would AI 
be the final invention we make?66 
 
 
 
                                                          
64 Zara Stone ‘Everything You Need To Know About Sophia, The World's First Robot Citizen’ (Forbes, 
2017) Available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zarastone/2017/11/07/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-sophia-the-worlds-first-robot-citizen/#2a849f7f46fa> Accessed on 23/01/2018 
65 Peter Drahos (n 23) p43 
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Conclusion 
This essay has traced different forms of AI and its impact on IP law. With the theoretical 
justifications as a main foundation for criticism, the impact of AI augmented individuals 
has been assessed to be potentially destructive to the patent system and as unjust to 
receive rights under both natural and economic justification theories. This points 
towards a need to adapt the system to a large influx of patents and better allocation of 
patents to prevent concentrated ownership. 
Similarly, the impact of semi-autonomous AI has been assessed as highly 
problematic as it can lead to a world of countless authorless artistic works. While it 
may not necessarily mean individuals are not awarded for their work, it shows that the 
IP system may be faced with a great deal of uncertainty. 
Finally, autonomous AI is deemed to hold the potential to render the entire IP 
system void if it does not recognise AI indistinguishable from humans as being able to 
hold IP rights, or creates provisions for them by resolving one of philosophy’s most 
laborious questions. 
Ultimately, the essay purports that technological advancements will force the 
IP system to change. If we are to avoid calamitous setbacks, we should prepare in 
advance for the cognitive revolution. 
 
 
